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NEW JERSEY V.

T.L. 0.: SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE

APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided New
Jersey u. TL.O., 1 a landmark case interpreting the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 The basic
holdings in the case were: first, the restrictions of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures do
apply to public school teachers and other school officials
because they are state governmental actors for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment; 3 second, the standard of reasonableness
for searches performed by such school officials is a mere
"reasonableness, under all the circumstances" test; 4 and third,
the school official's actions in the case did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 5
Several subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the
application of the Fourth Amendment in schools have cited
T.L.O. or used the test it set forth, but there has been no
modification to its core holdings. 6 However, this is not because
T.L. 0. did not leave open any unanswered questions or
unresolved issues. Indeed, the Court in its TL.O. opinion
intentionally left open and undecided several important issues.
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325 (1985).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. 'l'.L.O., 469 U.S. at i18il-i37.
1. !d. at :l:37-43.
5. /d. at 313-18.
6. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Bd. of
Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss one of the issues that
remains open and unanswered by the majority opinion: the
applicability of the exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency or
criminal proceedings when the evidence has been seized in a
school, by a school official, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
This paper will proceed in the following manner. Part II
will begin by providing a description of the T.L.O. case and its
holdings as well as a summary of subsequent Supreme Court
cases dealing with the Fourth Amendment's application in
schools. Part III will provide a discussion of the exclusionary
rule issue left open by the T.L. 0. opinion, specifically the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to juvenile delinquency
and criminal proceedings for violations of the Fourth
Amendment in school searches. Finally, Part IV will provide a
conclusion.

II.

NEW JERSEY v.

T.L. 0.

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to offer a detailed
exposition of the facts and holdings from the T.L.O. case in
order to understand what the open issues are and why they
were deliberately left open by the Supreme Court in the
opinion. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment commands that searches and seizures be
reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself." 7

A.

Facts

In 1980 at Piscataway High School in New Jersey, a
teacher discovered two teenage girls smoking in a school
restroom. 8 One of the two girls was fourteen-year-old T.L.O., a
high school freshman at the time. 9 Smoking on school grounds
was a violation of the school rules, so the teacher escorted the
two girls to the office of the school's principal. 10 There they

7. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 5ill, 5:17 (1985) (citing
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-42).
8. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at :128.
9. /d.
10. ld.
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were presented to the assistant vice principal, Theodore
Choplick, who questioned the two girls about the alleged
smoking in the restroom. 11 T.L.O.'s companion confessed to the
violation, but T.L.O. denied the allegations, even asserting that
she did not smoke at all. 12
With T.L.O.'s bold denial, Mr. Choplick requested that she
come into his private office. 13 There, Mr. Choplick demanded to
see the purse T.L.O. was carrying. 14 Mr. Choplick then opened
the purse and noticed a pack of cigarettes. 15 He removed the
cigarettes from the purse and held them up to T.L.O. and
accused her of lying to him. 16 Additionally, Mr. Choplick
noticed when he was removing the cigarettes from the purse
that there was also a package of cigarette rolling papers in the
purse. 17 In Mr. Choplick's experience at the high school,
possession of such rolling papers was consistently linked with
marijuana use. 18 Therefore, Mr. Choplick became even more
suspicious that T.L.O. was also involved in marijuana use, and
that there would be more evidence of it in her purse. 19 He then
engaged in a closer inspection of the purse and its contents. 20
In the purse, Mr. Choplick found a small amount of marijuana,
a pipe, some empty plastic bags, a significant amount of onedollar bills, an index card with a list of "people who owe me
money," and two letters that evidenced T.L.O.'s participation in
marijuana dealing. 21
With the discovery of this evidence, Mr. Choplick called
T.L.O.'s mother and the police. 22 Later, at the police station,
T.L.O. confessed to having engaged in marijuana dealing at the
high school. 23 Based on the evidence seized from the purse by
Mr. Choplick and T.L.O.'s confession, the State brought

11.
12.
18.
11.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

!d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
ld. at :l47.
!d. at :l28.
!d. at :i29.
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criminal delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court. 24
T.L.O. filed a motion to suppress, asking that the evidence
seized from her purse be excluded and that her confession be
excluded because it was tainted by the illegally-seized
evidence. 25
The trial court concluded that because the search was
reasonable, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the
evidence should not be suppressed. 26 T.L.O. was found to be
delinquent and was sentenced to one year of probation. 27
On appeal in the juvenile court case, the appellate division
affirmed the trial court's determination on the Fourth
Amendment question, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed, holding that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of T.L.O. and that the evidence should be
suppressed according to the exclusionary rule. 2R The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, holding, in essence, that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation in the case. 29

B.

Discussion

Justice White's majority opinion notes that certiorari was
originally granted in this case to answer the question of "the
appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by
public school authorities." 30 However, upon consideration, the
Court felt it would be wiser to first decide "what limits, if any,
the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school
authorities .... "31 Since the Court eventually decided that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the case, there
was no need to address what remedy, if any, would be required
in the event that there was a violation. 32
The Court analyzed the Fourth Amendment by dividing the
inquiry into three questions, and thus produced three linked

!d.
!d.
State ex rel. T.L.O., 128 A.2d 1327, 1::33:3-.31 (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. 1980).
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 3:30.
ld.
ld. at :317-18.
!d. at 327.
ld. at 3:32.
:32. Jd. at 3:3::3 n.:l.

21.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
:31.

NEWJERSEYV T.L.O.

2]

671

holdings. The first and threshold-type question the Court
answered was "whether [the Fourth] Amendment's prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches
conducted by public school officials." 33 Having answered that
question in the affirmative, the next issue was "the inquiry into
the standards governing such searches." 34 The Court decided
that school officials are not restricted by the Fourth
Amendment in the same manner as law enforcement officersthe standard in schools is a more relaxed, "reasonable grounds"
test. 35 Having announced the new test, the Court analyzed the
facts of the case in light of the newly announced standard and
held that T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
when Mr. Choplick searched and seized the contents of her
purse. 36 Each of the three parts of the Court's holding will be
discussed in order.

1. Public school officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment
As indicated above, the first and preliminary question that
the Court answered was whether public school officials are
subject to the restrictions imposed on government by the
Fourth Amendment. 37 Answering the question in the
affirmative, the Court progressed through the inquiry in logical
fashion. 38
The Court began by acknowledging, first, the undisputed
fact that the Fourth Amendment applies to States by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Second, the Fourteenth
Amendment indisputably protects the constitutional rights of
students from actions of public school officials:

:c~::l.

Id. at .13:3.
:14. !d. at il:i7.
35. !d. at ::>:i?-13.
il6. ld. at il13-18.
a7. ld. at 33il.
il8. ld. at 3:3:3-il7.
:39. Id. at :i34. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONS'!'. amend. IV,§ 1. The Fourth Amendment, and the accompanying remedy of
the exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states by the Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 64il (1961).
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The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures~Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes. 40

With these two foundational principles in place, the Court
further acknowledged that while the history of the Fourth
Amendment may suggest that it "was intended to regulate only
searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers,"
the Court has never limited it to only police conduct. 41 This is
because "[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized
in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials."42
Furthermore, the public schools function not as an exercise
of mere delegated parental authority, but as an exercise of
state authority. 43 This is supported by the "contemporary
reality" of compulsory education laws and "publicly mandated
educational and disciplinary policies. 44 Thus, public school
officials are state actors for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment; therefore they cannot claim parental immunity
from the constitutional restrictions. 45
Additionally, the Court had previously held that school
officials, as governmental actors, must comply with the
requirements of free speech rights under the First
Amendment, 46 and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
40. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :i19
U.S. 621, 637 (1943)).
41. Jd. at 334-35. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment restrictions have
been applied to other non-law enforcement governmental authorities. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S ..'307 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act
inspectors); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 199 (1978) (firemen); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (building inspectors).
42. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at il35 (quoting Camara, il87 U.S. at 528).
43. Jd. at 336.
14. Jd. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 130 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)).
15. Jd. at 336-37.
16. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :i9il U.S. 503 (1969).
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Amendment. 47 Therefore, it would only make sense to require
that public school officials, still functioning as governmental
actors, also conform their actions to the privacy protections of
the Fourth Amendment. 48

2. Standard governing school searches
Having decided that the Fourth Amendment does apply to
school officials, the Court then had to analyze the bigger
question of what standards of reasonableness would apply to
searches and seizures in public schools. 49 With the "underlying
command" of the Fourth Amendment being that searches and
seizures must be reasonable, the Court established a standard
of reasonableness to be applied in searches and seizures
performed in public schools. The Court's determination of what
is reasonable included a balancing test. 50
Since what makes a search or seizure reasonable or not
depends heavily on the context, the inquiry requires finding the
proper balance between "the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security. . . [and] the
government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches
of the public order." 51 ln this case, the privacy interest of the
individual, T.L.O., was in her purse, a personal item that she
carried with her. 52 The Court indicated that a student's
expectation of privacy in such items of personal property was
one that society would be "prepared to recognize as legitimate,"
a necessity to receive Fourth Amendment protection. 53
However, on the government's side of the balancing test, the
school has an "equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place." 54 Given the
significant competing considerations, the Court felt it
necessary to ease somewhat the restrictions normally imposed
by the Fourth Amendment. 55

47. Goss v. Lopez, 119 U.S. 565 (1975).
18. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at :l:l6.
49. Id. at :3:37.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Jd. at ilil7-:l8.
5il. Id. at il:J8-:l9 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
54. ld. at :110.
55. Id. at il10-1il.

674

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

Thus, for the unique public school setting, the Court
departed from the probable cause and warrant requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. 56 This was for several stated reasons.
The warrant requirement is ill-suited for the school
environment because it "would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools." 57 Additionally, the warrant requirement
has been abandoned in other cases where "the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search." 58 Furthermore, "[t]he fundamental
command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and
seizures be reasonable, and although 'both the concept of
probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the
reasonableness of a search, ... in certain limited circumstances
neither is required."' 59 Thus, the Court rationalized by stating,
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops
short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard." 60
The Court then announced that the new standard for school
searches would be simply a test of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. 61 This inquiry has two parts: "first, one must
consider 'whether the ... action was justified at its inception;' 62
second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' 63 The first part of the test will be satisfied under
ordinary circumstances "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules

56. ld.
57. Id. at 340.
58. ld. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33).
59. ld. at 340-41 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United Statl,s, -11:1 U.S. 26G, 277
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
60. Id. at ::l41. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. ()18 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (197G); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 87:3
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (19()8).
61. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at 311.
G2. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
63. Id.
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of the school." 64 The second part of the test is satisfied "when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."65
Providing justification and support for its newly announced
test, the Court stated:
This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should
ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools. 66

Having announced the new reasonableness standard for
school searches, the main question remaining was how it would
be applied to the case at hand. 67

3. The search was reasonable
Applying the "reasonable grounds" standard to the facts of
the case, the Court concluded "that the search was in no sense
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes." 68 This case
involved two distinct searches, and the first provided the basis
for the second. 69 Therefore, "the validity of the search for
marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial
search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to
suspect that T.L.O. possessed marihuana had the first search
not taken place." 70 Since T.L.O. had been accused of smoking
but had denied it, the idea that she had cigarettes in her purse
was not unreasonable. 71 Accordingly, the Court also stated that

61.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

!d.
!d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.
/d.

at :111-12.
at :112.
at :312-1:3.
at 84i1.
at 34:1-11.
at :144.
at :316.
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"it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when
he examined T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes." 72
Since Mr. Choplick's suspicions of marijuana use were raised
when he saw the package of rolling papers in plain sight just as
he removed the cigarettes from the purse, his resulting
examination of the contents of the purse for evidence of
marijuana use was justified. 73 All of the evidence discovered
upon further inspection of the purse was therefore seized
reasonably, and none of T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when this evidence was used against her in the
juvenile court delinquency charges. 74

C.

Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions on the Application of
the Fourth Amendment in Schools

Since the T.L.O. decision, twenty-five years of litigation has
yielded only three Supreme Court cases dealing with the
application of the Fourth Amendment in schools. 75 These cases
did not modify the T.L. 0. standard. Indeed, only one of the
cases contained the right set of circumstances that required the
actual use of the "reasonable grounds" test.7 6 Additionally,
none of the cases involved criminal-type charges against a
student in juvenile court as did T.L.0.; 77 all were civil rights
lawsuits.7 8 Two of the cases were based on suspicionless
searches, and the other was initially based on individualized
reasonable suspicion. A brief examination of these cases serves
to further show how and in what manner the Court has
repeatedly treated school cases specially and differently than
non-school cases for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
1. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton

The first school search case post-T.L.O. was Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, which was based on a

72. Id.
7::3. !d. at 34 7.
74. !d. at 347-48.
75. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 263:3 (2009); Bd. of Educ.,
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995).
76. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633.
77. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329.
78. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638; Earls, 5:36 U.S. at 826-27; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
651-52.
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suspicionless search, in the "special needs" category of Fourth
Amendment cases. 79 In the case, a school district, in an effort
to curb the tide of drug use in its schools, instituted a policy of
mandatory urine testing for all students participating in school
sports. 80 The policy required the student and his or her parents
to sign a consent form agreeing to the testing before the
student could participate in any school sport. 81 A student
(Acton) brought suit against the school district because he was
denied the opportunity to play on a school football team
because his parents would not agree to sign the consent form. 82
Acton claimed that this policy was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Court noted that the T.L. 0. decision made the Fourth
Amendment applicable to school officials. 83 It was also noted
that the public school context fell into the "special needs"
category of the Fourth Amendment, thus reducing the level of
suspiciOn required from probable cause to reasonable
suspicion. 84 However, instead of engaging in the actual
"reasonable grounds" test articulated in T.L.O., the Court in
Acton engaged in a balancing analysis of the privacy interest
involved against the governmental interest. 85 While not
explicitly stated, it seems that the "reasonable grounds" test
was not used in Vernonia because the case involved a
suspicionless search policy and not an actual search by a school
official that had already taken place. 86 After weighing the
minimal privacy interest students had and the minimal
intrusion into those interests against the heavy interest the
School District had in eradicating student drug use and the
policy's reasonably effective means of meeting that interest, the
Court found no Fourth Amendment violation and ruled in favor
of the School District. 87

79. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
80. Jd. at 618-51.
81. ld.
82. !d. at 651-52.
8il. Jd. at 652 (citing T.L.O., 169 U.S. at icl36-37).
81. !d. at 65i3.
85. !d. at 651-66.
86. Cf id. at 653 (the search the Court approved of in T.L.O. was based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing).
87. !d. at 651-66.
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2. Board of Education, Pottawatomie County v. Earls
The next case dealing with the Fourth Amendment in
schools was Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 88 another suspicionless
search case whose facts were strikingly similar to those in
Vernonia. In Earls, the School Board implemented a policy that
required all students who wished to participate in any
competitive extracurricular activity to submit to drug testing.x 9
A student (Earls) who was a participant in several
extracurricular activities, including show choir and marching
band, brought an action against the school district. 90 Earls
alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. 91
The Court ruled in favor of the school, and engaged in an
analysis virtually identical to the Vernonia opinion. The first
consideration was "the nature of the privacy interest allegedly
compromised by the drug testing." 92 The determination on this
issue was that "[a] student's privacy interest is limited in a
public school environment where the State is responsible for
maintaining discipline, health, and safety. Schoolchildren are
routinely required to submit to physical examinations and
vaccinations against disease." 93
The next consideration was "the character of the intrusion
imposed by the Policy." 94 The Court determined that requiring
students to produce a urine sample behind the closed door of a
bathroom stall was "even less problematic" than the
"negligible" intrusion in Vernonia. 95 Concluding the issue of the
nature of the intrusion, the Court stated, "[g]iven the
minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the
limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that
the invasion of students' privacy is not significant." 96

88.
536 U.S.
89.
90.

Bd. of Education of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. !';uris,
822 (2002).
Earls, 536 U.S. at 825.
ld. at 826-27.

91. ld.

92.
9:-l.
91.
95.
(1995)).
96.

ld.
I d.
Id.
Id.

at 830.
at 830-31 (italics omitted).
at 832.
at 832-33 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658

Id. at 831.
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As the final consideration in its analysis, the Court
considered "the nature and immediacy of the government's
concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them.' 197 For
this analysis of the government's interest, the Court concluded
by saying:
we find that testing students who participate in
extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of
addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in
preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use.. . . [W]e
conclude that the drug testing . . . effectively serves the
School District's interest in protecting the safety and health of
its students. 98
It is also significant to note in Earls the Court's response to
the argument that the drug testing should be based only upon
an "individualized reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing." 99
Rejecting that argument, the Court stated, "[i]n this context,
the Fourth Amendment does not require a finding of
individualized suspicion, and we decline to impose such a
requirement on schools attempting to prevent and detect drug
use by students." 100 While Earls had argued that requiring an
individualized suspicion would be less intrusive, the Court
questioned whether this would, in reality, be less intrusive. 101
The Court suggested that such a requirement would result in
an additional burden placed on teachers, who "might unfairly
target members of unpopular groups," and could render the
whole program ineffective due to "the fear of lawsuits resulting
from targeted searches." 102 Furthermore, the Court pointed out
that "reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not
require employing the least intrusive means, because 'the logic
of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could
raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all searchand-seizure powers."' 103 Additionally, the Court reiterated that
"the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of

97. /d. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660).
98. !d. at 888.
99. /d. at 837.
100. /d. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
101. /d.
102. /d. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-61 (offering similar reasons for why
"testing based on 'suspicion' of drug use would not be better, but worse")).
108. /d. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 128 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976)).
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[individualized] suspicion." 104 Indeed, "[i]n certain limited
circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent
or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy
entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion." 10 5
In summary, the Court reasoned that in the safety and
administrative regulations context, departing from the
probable cause requirement may be reasonable "when 'special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."' 106
Therefore, the Court ruled that the drug testing policy was not
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and ruled in favor of the
school district.
3. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding

In the only Supreme Court case since T.L.O. that involved
an actual search of a student by a school official, the Court
ruled in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding that the
"strip-search" of a student violated the Fourth Amendment. 107
Using the two-part test articulated in T.L.O., the search was
held to be excessive in its scope. 10 x However, due to the lack of
clearly established law on the subject of school strip-searches,
the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity. 109
In this case, Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson of Safford
Middle School received information from two other students
that Savana Redding, another student, was possibly in
violation of school policy by having and/or distributing
prescription strength and over-the-counter pain reliever
pills. 110 Wilson confronted and questioned Redding, but she
denied having ever given pills to another student and denied
having any pills in her possession. 111 Wilson and another
school official, Helen Romero, then searched Redding's

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 829 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561).
ld. at 829 (quoting Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 48:3 U.S. 868, 87:3 (1987)).
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 26:33, 26il7-B8 (2009).
!d. at 2639-43.
ld. at 2643-44.
ld. at 2638-41.
ld. at 26:38.
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backpack, but found nothing. 112 Wilson then instructed Romero
to take Redding to the school nurse's office and search her
clothes for pills. 113 Romero and the school nurse, Peggy
Schwallier, then had Redding remove her clothes down to her
bra and underwear. 114 Redding was then told to "pull her bra
out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on
her underpants .... " 115 No pills were ever found. 116 Redding's
mother subsequently filed suit on behalf of her daughter
against the school district and the school officials involved. 117
In its analysis of the facts of the case under the two-part
reasonable-grounds test from T.L.O., the Court acknowledged
that the search of Redding's backpack and outer clothing was
justified at its inception due to the information Wilson had
gathered
from
other students
concerning Redding's
involvement with pain pills. 118 However, once the search
extended to the point where Redding was required to expose
herself by shaking out her underwear, this degree of intrusion
did not match the kind of suspicion Wilson had. 119 This was
because there was no evidence whatsoever that would have
indicated a chance that Redding had pills stuffed inside her
underwear. 120 Additionally, "Wilson had no reason to suspect
that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or
that individual students were receiving great numbers of
pills." 121 This indicated a lack of reason to believe that there
was a "danger to the students from the power of the drugs or
their quantity." 122 The Court thought "that the combination of
these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search
reasonable." 123 Therefore, the Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment rights of Redding had been violated. 124

112.
11:3.
111.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
12:1.
121.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
Id.
!d.
!d.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

2640-11.
2612.
2642-4:!.
2642.
2642-4il.
264:!.
26:!7.
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The Court in Redding had no occasion to address the
exclusionary rule question from T.L. 0. since there were no
criminal proceedings. 125 Therefore, the exclusionary rule was
inapplicable. 126 Thus, even after several school Fourth
Amendment cases, the question concerning the contours of the
application of the exclusionary rule in the school search context
remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. However, these
cases do provide some insight into how the Court typically
treats school cases differently than other Fourth Amendment
cases.

Ill. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
This section will discuss the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency and criminal
proceedings involving violations of the Fourth Amendment in
schools. First, the cases that have dealt directly with the issue
and have either applied or rejected the rule will be discussed.
Second, a summary of the courts' rationales will be provided.
Finally, additional discussion of the issue from scholarly
sources will be provided.

A.

Cases That Have Applied the Exclusionary Rule

Both before and after the T.L. 0. decision, most courts
across the country have applied the exclusionary rule in the
juvenile and criminal proceedings to evidence obtained in a
school search or seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment.
However, there are differences among the analyses engaged in
and the rationales given by the various courts in the majority
view. With no guidance from the Supreme Court as of yet, the
manner in which to analyze the issue is virtually wide open.
Of the reported cases in which the exclusionary rule was
used to suppress the evidence obtained in schools in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, a handful of the courts have applied
the rule without analysis of whether such application of the
rule is appropriate. 127 Two courts have simply applied, without
125. Id. at 2638.
126. See United States v .•Janis, 428 U.S. 1::3::3 (1976).
127. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1971) (college dorm
room); In reAppeal in Pima Cnty .•Juvenile Action No. 80181-1, 7:l:i P.2d :316, :l18
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); T .•J. v. State, 538 So. 2d 1:!20, 1:322 (Fla. Oist. Ct. App. 1989)
(cites only to normal police cases for support); T.AO'B. v. State, 159 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.
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hesitation or analysis, specific state statutes that require
suppression in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence
seized illegally. 12 x There are only a few cases containing some
amount of analysis and rationale concerning the acceptance of
the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional school searches
resulting in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 129
In Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified School District, a
California Appellate Court carefully considered whether to
apply the exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, and decided that it should apply. 130 The court
determined that there was no good reason to treat school
searches differently from other government searches when it
comes to juvenile and criminal prosecutions. 131 Therefore, in
the court's logic, since the Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment is "applicable to attack evidence acquired
in administrative searches and offered in criminal
prosecutions," it should similarly be available in the context of
school searches that result in juvenile prosecutions. 132
Concluding its determination of the applicability of the
exclusionary rule, the court gave this statement:
While we concur with the idea that the Fourth Amendment
and the exclusionary rule are not coextensive, we must
disagree with a line of demarcation which would treat
prosecuted high school students differently from any other
defendant. It is no less offensive to the Constitution to permit
the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence in a juvenile
or criminal prosecution simply because the site of its

Dist. Ct. App. 1984); A.B. v. State, 440 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. i\pp. 1983); M.J. v.
State, 399 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. i\pp. 1981); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 320
(La. 1975); People v. D., i-358 N.Y.S.2d 40il, 410 (N.Y. 1974); People v. Bowers, 356
N.Y.S.2d 4:-32,136 (N.Y. i\pp. Term 1971); People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 71:-l (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. 1968) (college dorm room); In re Fisher, No. :-35:-375, 1977 Ohio App. LEXlS
7:-380, at *7 (Ohio Ct. i\pp. 1977); Commonwealth v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957, 958 (!'a.
Super. Ct. 2000); Dumas v. Pennsylvania, 515 i\.2d 981, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 i\.2d 271, 27 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970) (college dorm
room).
128. See Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827, 831 (N.M. Ct. i\pp. 1975); Coronado v. State,
8:-35 S.W.2d 6il6, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
129. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985); Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified Sch.
Dist., 162 Cal. i\pp. 3d 5ii0 (Cal. Ct. i\pp. 1984); In re Dominic W., 426 A.2d 4:-32 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1981); In re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983) rev'd on other grounds 469
U.S. 325 (1985); In re L., 280 N.W.2d :H3 (Wis. Ct. i\pp. 1979).
130. 162 Cal. i\pp. iid at 540-12.
131. Id. at 541.
1:-32. /d.
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improper acquisition happened to have been a high school
campus. Arguably, it is more so. 133

Therefore, the rule should be fully available in juvenile and
criminal prosecutions when evidence is obtained in schools, by
school officials, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 134
In the case of In re William G., the California Supreme
Court approved of the appellate court's reasoning and provided
at least some reasoned analysis of its own for its application of
the exclusionary rule. 135 After deciding that the evidence in the
case was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
court decided:
[T]he exclusionary rule is the only appropriate remedy for
this violation when ... the evidence is sought to be admitted
in a juvenile or criminal prosecution. The exclusionary rule is
intended not only to have a deterrent effect on police
misconduct, but to preserve the integrity of the judicial
system .... [T]he exclusionary rule "gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. 136

Therefore, it seemed that the most important rationale for
the court's decision was that the exclusionary rule was
important to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. 137
The court did not consider the value of the deterrent effect
rationale as it would apply to non-law-enforcement, like the
school teacher or official.
In similar reliance on Mapp v. Ohio, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals decided in the case of In Re Dominic W. that
the exclusionary rule did apply. 13 s The court's reasons
included: (1) a state education statute made it clear that the
search was government action and that the school official in
the case was an agent of the state, (2) the same state statute
also required probable cause for such searches, and (3) the
constitution compels the exclusionary rule because of Mapp u.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

ld. at 542.
ld.
In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1298 (Cal. 19B5).
ld. at 1298 n.17 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 613, 660 (1961)).
See id.
In re W., 426 A.2d 132, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. i\pp. 1981).
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Ohio. 139 However, other than merely citing to Mapp, the
Maryland court did not explain why exactly it felt that the
exclusionary rule was constitutionally compelled in this type of
case, nor did it mention any of the general rationales behind
the rule. 140 Interestingly, it seemed that the probable cause
requirement imposed by the state statute blurred any
distinction the court may have drawn between the school
setting and normal law enforcement activities. 141
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided In Interest of L.L.
and determined, with somewhat more substantial analysis,
that the exclusionary rule applied in the case. 142 The court
initially acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from violating the
Fourth Amendment by using illegally obtained evidence in a
criminal prosecution. 143 The court further stated that "[t]his
prohibition or 'exclusionary rule' has been the principal method
of ensuring that the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not become an
expression without substance." 144 The court then noted that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that while
"juvenile delinquency proceedings are not subject to all of the
formal requirements of an adult criminal prosecution ... [they]
need to provide the basic elements of due process." 145 The court
determined that due process did not allow the use of such
illegally obtained evidence because the exclusionary rule is one
of the basic elements of due process, and the juvenile
delinquency proceeding could result in a deprivation of
liberty. 146
Furthermore, the Wisconsin court criticized the Georgia
Supreme Court for its analysis in State v. Young 147-the
primary case in the country that has rejected the application of
the exclusionary rule to school searches-stating:

1:39. /d.
110. /d.
111. See id.
112. In re L., 90 Wis.2d 585,591-93 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
14:l. /d. at 592.
144. /d. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12).
115. !d. at 592 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
116. /d. See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-17 (rejecting the argument that since
juvenile court proceedings were technically civil and not criminal, the normal
Constitutional Due Process requirements did not apply).
117. 216 S.K2d 586 (Ga. 1975).
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Once the evidence comes into the possession of law
enforcement officers and is used in court proceedings against
the liberty interests of the person searched, the exclusionary
rule must be available to deter prosecutions based on
unlawful searches. Without such exclusions, school personnel
and other government employees would become the same sort
of bypass around the amendment's protections that the Court
meant to close by extending the exclusionary rule to state
court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio. 148

Thus, it seems that the Wisconsin court's primary
rationales for adopting the exclusionary rule were that (1) it is
the principal method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment and
(2) due process guarantees that deprivations of liberty will not
be justified by evidence that was obtained in violation of the
Constitution. 149
The only other known case that engages in any analysis in
its consideration of the application of the exclusionary rule in
juvenile proceedings is the New Jersey Supreme Court's
opinion in In re T.L.0. 150 Before the United States Supreme
Court issued its opinion in New Jersey u. T.L.O., the New
Jersey Supreme Court had held that (1) the search at issue was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and (2) the proper
remedy was the exclusionary rule. 151 Since the United States
Supreme Court reversed only on the New Jersey court's
determination of whether the search was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the determination that the exclusionary
rule is the proper remedy for such a violation still stands. 152
In its analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court
acknowledged that while some argue that the exclusionary rule
should not apply because the basic purpose of Mapp u. Ohio
was to deter law enforcement from committing constitutional
violations, the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of
Education not excepted." 153 Since the school officials are

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
Educ. v.

In re L., 90 Wis.2d at 593 n.l.
See id.
463 A.2d 9:11.
!d. at 938-39.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. :-l25, :i:33 n.:J (1985).
In re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 931, 938-:19 (N .•J. 198:l) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Barnette, 319 U.S. 621, 637 (191il)).
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governmental officials for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
the court rationalized:
It is of little comfort to one charged in a law enforcement
proceeding whether the public official who illegally obtained
evidence was a municipal inspector, a firefighter, or school
administrator or law enforcement official. We believe that the
issue is settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and we
accept the proposition that if an official search violates
constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in
criminal proceedings. 154

The court found further support for its decision in a state
statute that made the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures applicable to juvenile proceedings where
"a juvenile is charged with an offense ... that would be a
criminal offense if committed by an adult." 155 The decision on
this issue, similar to the Wisconsin court in In re L., seemed to
turn on the court's view that an individual's liberty right not to
be prosecuted under evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is an absolute due process guarantee of the
Constitution, no matter what type of governmental official does
the violation. 156

B.

Cases That Have Not Applied the Exclusionary Rule

Only few courts, with varying rationales, have rejected the
exclusionary rule as a remedy to Fourth Amendment violations
in schools. 157 Although they are apparently the minority view,
these cases provide valuable and reasoned analysis and add to
the quality of the discussion.
United States v. Coles, although not technically a
traditional public school case, nor a juvenile delinquency
prosecution, provides an analogous situation. 158 The defendant,
Coles, was a student or "corpsman" at a Civilian Conservation
Center. 159 The Center was "one of the Job Corps centers

151. !d. at gag (citations omitted).
155. !d. at gag n.5.
156. See id. at g:J8-8g.
157. United States v. Coles, 802 F. Supp. gg (D. Me. 1g6g) (at Civilian
Conservation Center); D.R.C. v. State, 616 1'.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1g82); State v.
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1g75); State v. Wingerd, 818 N.K2d 866 (Ohio Ct. App.
1g7 4) (college dorm room).
158. Coles, 802 F. Supp. at 101-08.
15g. !d. at 100.

688

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

established and operated by the Office of Economic
Opportunity pursuant to the provisions of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964." 160 This facility IS analogous to a
public school because
[t]he purpose of the Job Corps program is to provide, in a
group setting, intensive programs of education, vocational
training and work experience for low income, disadvantaged
young men and women in order to assist them to become more
responsible and productive citizens. In order to promote
proper moral and disciplinary conditions at the centers,
standards of conduct and deportment are to be provided, and
the individual directors are given full authority to discipline
the corpsmen. 161
Additionally, the search at issue in the case "was conducted
solely for the purpose of ensuring proper moral and disciplinary
conditions at the Center, an obligation mandated by federal
statute." 162
The court in Coles decided that the exclusionary rule was
not appropriate to apply in such an educational-facility type of
setting. 163 This was because of the underlying rationale of the
exclusionary rule as it was originally formulated by the
Supreme Court 164 was "to force law enforcement officers to
observe Fourth Amendment rights." 165 Therefore, relying on its
determinations that (1) the administrative officer at the center
did not have the status or powers of a law enforcement officer,
(2) the search was not conducted "at the behest of, or in
cooperation with, any law enforcement officer," and (3) the
object of the search was not to "procure evidence of a crime or
in any way to facilitate an anticipated federal prosecution," the
court decided:
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that excluding
the evidence seized by [the Administrative Officer of the
Center] would improve standards of federal law enforcement,
since [he] is neither a law enforcement officer not is he
answerable to one. And exclusion in the present case could

160. Id.
161. !d.
162. !d.
16:3. Id.
164. Jd.
165. Id.
613 (1961)).

at 101 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2701 (1968)).
at 101 (citations omitted).
at 102.
at 102-03.
at 102 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. :i83 (1911)).
(citing Linkletter v. Walker, :i81 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
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hardly be expected to affect the conduct of those, who ... are
essentially unconcerned with the success of federal criminal
prosecutions. 166

Therefore defendant's motion to suppress was denied,
because the court viewed the exclusionary rule as primarily~
and historically~a deterrent for law enforcement. 167 No other
exclusionary rule rationale was mentioned.
In State v. Wingerd~also not a juvenile delinquency case~
an Ohio court decided that the exclusionary rule should not be
applied to a search of a college dorm room by an official
responsible for the operation of the residence hall. 168 However,
the court assumed, without discussion, that the search was
conducted by a private citizen, not a law enforcement
agency. 169 Therefore, the court reasoned, the exclusionary rule
is inappropriate because it was "fashioned 'to prevent and not
repair,' and [its] target is official misconduct. [It is] 'to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way~by removing the incentive to disregard it.'" 170 It
is unclear how the court would have differed had it found that
the residence hall supervisor was a governmental actor for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 171
The primary case in the country holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply as a remedy to
unconstitutional school searches is a Georgia Supreme Court
case, State v. Young. 172 The court decided that the search at
issue did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but unlike the
United States Supreme Court in T.L.O., 173 the Georgia court
went ahead and decided "that the exclusionary would not apply
even if the Fourth Amendment had been violated." 174
In its analysis, the Georgia court noted that the
exclusionary rule does not always apply when there is a Fourth
Amendment violation, and the rule has not been used by the

166. !d. at 10:1.
16 7. See id. at 102-(J:l.
168. 318 N.E.2d at 867-69.
169. /d. at 869.
170. !d. (quoting Coolidge v. N. H .• 103 U.S. 413, 488 (1971) (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))).
171. See id. at 868-69.
1 72. 216 S.K 2d 586.
1 n. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985).
174. State v. Young, 216 S.K2d 586,588 (Ga. 1975).
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Supreme Court in contexts other than violations by law
enforcement officers. 175 Furthermore, the court recognized that
the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule are not coextensive when it stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires
only state action; the [exclusionary rule] requires state law
enforcement action." 176 To determine the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and exclusionary rule, "the proper test is a
balancing test." 177 For the exclusionary rule, "the expected
benefits and the expected detriments of applying the
exclusionary rule must be weighed to determine whether that
rule may be invoked to suppress the fruits of the search." 1n
The court then boldly stated:
There is nothing sacrosanct about the exclusionary rule; it is
not embedded in the constitution and it is not a personal
constitutional right: "In sum, the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 179

Additionally, the opinion suggests that the attitude of the
Supreme Court has shifted away from extending the
exclusionary rule to additional contexts outside of the
traditional law enforcement context. 180 The Supreme Court
explained that the tragic flaw of the exclusionary rule has to do
with who truly pays the price of excluding evidence: "It is well
to remember that when incriminating evidence is found on a
suspect and that evidence is then suppressed, 'the pain of
suppression is felt, not by the inanimate State or by some
penitent policemen, but by the offender's next victims."' 181
The Court decided that for purposes of Fourth Amendment
searches, there are three categories of actors: "private persons;
governmental agents whose conduct is state action invoking
the Fourth Amendment; and governmental law enforcement
agents for whose violations of Fourth Amendment the
exclusionary rule will be applied." 182 Public school officials are

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

!d.
Jd.
!d.
Jd.
Id.
Id.
!d.
Jd.

at 589 (citing United States v. Calandra, 411 U.S. :3:38 (1971)).
(emphasis added).
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S at 349).
at 589-90 (quoting Calandra, 114 U.S. at ilct8).
at 590.
(quoting In re G.C., 296 A.2d 102, 105 (N .•J. Union Cnty. Ct. 1972)).
at 591.
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therefore m the intermediate group, because they are state
actors for Fourth Amendment purposes, but not law
enforcement officials. 183 Finally, justified by the principles that
(1) "the exclusionary rule does not reach as far as does the
Fourth Amendment," (2) the rule has only been applied to law
enforcement action, and (3) "the tide is turning ... away from
the exclusionary rule," the court held that the exclusionary rule
is not a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by
school officials. 184 Further justifying this holding, the court
recognizes that students still have other remedies to pursue if
their Fourth Amendment rights are violated, such as civil
rights or tort actions seeking damages. 185
In the latest known case in which a court held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply, an Alaska court in D.R.C. v.
State based its holding on somewhat different grounds. 186 Even
though the court's determination that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the actions of school officials 187 has since been
overruled by the Supreme Court, 188 the discussion of the
purposes of behind the exclusionary rule is valuable. 189
In its discussion of the exclusionary rule, the court noted
the rule's purpose: "[t]he enforcement of school regulations, the
safeguarding of students during school hours through
confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and the
maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide
substantial incentives to 'search' that would not be lessened by
the suppression of evidence at a subsequent delinquency
proceeding." 190 The court further draws upon analysis from a
law review article and states:
As Ziff points out in his note, "[F]or the exclusionary rule to
be an effective deterrent, the party committing the search
must have foreknowledge of an exclusionary rule plus a
substantial interest in seeing that a conviction is obtained."
While school officials may search frequently enough to
warrant their understanding the applicable rules, they are

18il.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

/d.
/d.
/d.
616 1'.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
/d. at 256 n.9.
169 U.S. at aa6.
See /J.R.C., 616 1'.2d at 258--61.
/d. at 258 (citation omitted).
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primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline
rather than obtaining convictions. 191

The court also reasoned that the historic application of the
Fourth Amendment is to (1) "investigations of those suspected
of crime by those performing the function of police officers," and
(2) the "area-wide exploratory investigations, with or without a
suspect, carried out by specialized law enforcement officers in
order to prevent crime (including violation of health and safety
regulations)," and the school fits neither of those situations. 192
Overall, the court seemed to rely heavily on the fact that school
officials are not looking to "ferret out criminals," but are simply
trying to maintain school discipline, therefore, the deterrent
purposes of the Fourth Amendment would not be served by
applying the exclusionary rule in such a setting. 193

C.

Summary of Courts' Rationales

In summary, the rationales used by the courts applying the
exclusionary rule have been, essentially: (1) the rule is
necessary to preserve judicial integrity, 194 (2) constitutional
due process guarantees citizens the right not to be deprived of
liberty based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, no matter what kind of government official
performs the illegal search, 195 and (3) it is the principal method
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 196 Conversely, the
rationales used by courts deciding not to apply the rule have
generally and essentially been: (1) the primary goal and history
of the rule is deterrence, which is a poor fit for the school
setting since school officials, although state actors, are not law
enforcement officers trying to ferret out crime, 197 (2) the
school's need to maintain safety and discipline makes the cost

191. Id. at 258 n.10 (quoting Harvey L. Ziff, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion
in Criminal Cases, 19 :STAN. L. REV. 608, 614 (1967)).
192. Id. at 260.
193. See id.
194. See In re G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985).
195. See Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified Sch. Dist., 162 Cal. App. :-ld 580 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984); In re W., 426 A.2d 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); In re T.L.O., 163 A.2d 9.'31
(N.J. 1983); In re L., 280 N.W.2d :-34:-3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
196. See In reG., 709 P.2d 1287; In re L., 280 N.W.2d 31:3.
197. See United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me. 1969); D.R.C., 646 P.2d
252; State v. Young, 216 S.K2d 586 (Ga. 1975); State v. Wingerd, 318 N.K2d 866 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1974).
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of having the rule too high, 198 (3) the rule is not a constitutional
right, it is merely a judicially created remedy that does not
reach as far as does the Fourth Amendment. 199

D.

Additional Discussion from Scholarly Sources

In addition to what rationales various courts have relied on
in their rulings regarding the applicability of the exclusionary
rule to juvenile and criminal proceedings based on evidence
seized in a school by a school official, some scholars have
participated in the discussion. These publications have injected
their own assessments, as well as arguments for and against
the application of the rule.
Of the existing scholarly publications that actually argue a
position on the issue, virtually all argue that the exclusionary
rule should apply in juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceedings when the evidence is obtained by a school official
(assuming no police involvement) 200 in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 201 Others simply discuss the likelihood of the

198. See Young, 216 S.E.2d 586.
199. See id.
200. In its T.L.O. opinion, the Supreme Court deliberately left undecided the issue
of how school searches should be treated for Fourth Amendment purposes when
conducted with involvement by law enforcement. 469 U.S. at 342 n.7 ("We here
consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own
authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for
assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at
the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question.").
Although there are virtually no clear lines and plenty of gray areas, courts that have
addressed the issue of police involvement in the school search have generally held the
law enforcement to a higher standard of suspicion if the search was at the direction of
law enforcement rather than the school official. See, e.g., M .•J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court held that the search required probable cause because
police officer acted in concert with school official in questioning and threatening
student until student gave up concealed contraband); Picha v. Wielgus, 410 F. Supp.
1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (search had to be based on probable cause because police caused
school officials to perform the search). But see, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977
(6th Cir. 1984) (level of suspicion was not raised from reasonable suspicion to probable
because the mere presence of police did not raise the standard when school official were
not acting on any direction of the police).
201. See, e.g., William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students
in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 741-42 n.20 (1974); Gerald S. Reamey, New
,Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J.
933, 91:3 (1985); Brenda Jones Walts, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Questions the Court
/Jid Not Answer About School Searches, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 421, 430-33 (1985); Charles
W. Hardin, Jr., Comment, Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the Exclusionary Rule,
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1099, 1109-14 (1986); Deborah A. Reperowitz, Note, School Officials
May Conduct Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness Test in Order to Maintain
Educational Environment, 14 SETON HALL L. REV 738 (1984); Ronald L. Vance,
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Supreme Court's future acceptance of the rule,2° 2 or argue for
an alternative approach. 203
One main point of argument concerning the exclusionary
rule's applicability has to do with the deterrence rationale. The
basic notion of the rationale is that applying the exclusionary
rule in juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings to evidence
seized by school officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment
will deter school officials from future violations by removing
their incentives to engage in unlawful searches. 204
Some argue that even if the deterring effect of the
exclusionary rule on school officials is uncertain, it still
remains the best remedy because all of the existing
alternatives are found wanting or impractical. 205 Others argue
that the exclusionary rule would not deter constitutional
violations in schools because the relationship between school
officials and students is too unlike the police-criminal
relationship, that is, the school official's primary duty is to
educate students, not catch criminals. 206 One scholar noted:

Comment, School Search-The Supreme Court"s Adoption of a "Rea8onable Su8picion'"
Standard in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the Hei{fhtened Need for Extension of the
Exclusionary Rule to School Search Cases, 10 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 271-82 (1985).
202. Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Door Left Open: Applicability of the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juvenile Court Delinquency Hearing<;, 21 AM . •].
CIUM. L. 29 (1996).
203. J. Chad Mitchell, Comment, An Alternative Approach to the Fourth
Amendment in Public Schools: Balancin{f Students' Ri{fhts with School Safety, 1998
llYU L. REV. 1207, 1230-10 (1998).
204. See Buss, supra note 201, at 741-42 n.20; Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 3842; Walts, supra note 201, at 131-32; Hardin, supra note 201, at 1110-12; Mitchell,
supra note 203, at 1225-27; Vance, supra note 201, at 276-78.
205. See Buss, supra note 201, at 7 42 n.20 (alternative methods have been less
than effective at deterring police); Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 11-2 (as a practical
matter, other remedies may not be available); Mitchell, supra note 20:3, at 1227-28
(other remedies are practically foreclosed); Vance, supra note 201, at 279-81
(alternative methods of enforcement pose too many difficulties for students to be a
viable remedy).
206. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1225 (citing United States v. Janis, 128 U.S. 1:>:3,
450-52 (1976); Dallin H. Oaks, Studyin{f the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970)) ("The teacher's goal is to educate, encourage and help
their students, far different from that of a police officer's goals to thwart and
apprehend suspected criminals. Since no accurate empirical data exists as to whether
the exclusionary rule actually works in the criminal setting, the student-teacher
relationship casts even more doubt upon the rule's deterrent effects among this type of
non-adversarial relationship."). See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1111 ("[AJ teacher
is not likely to be thinking very much about a juvenile delinquency or a criminal
proceeding, and his or her behavior is not likely to he influenced very much by the
admissibility of the evidence in such proceedings.").

2]

NEW JERSEY V T.L. 0.

695

On the one hand, it can be argued that school administrators
care only about the safety of students and teachers, and
therefore they would continue to search students to retrieve
drugs and weapons regardless of whether that evidence could
be legally used in juvenile court. On the other hand, such
students may present serious disciplinary problems, and
administrators may want them removed from school. One
way to facilitate such a result is to make legal searches so
that the evidence can be used in juvenile court, which may
result in placement of the child away from the home. Viewed
in this manner, the deterrent impact is heightened, for the
school administrator is much like a police officer who wants a
criminal off the streets. 207

However, with the relatively recent influx of school
disciplinary "zero-tolerance" policies, it is more likely that a
student would be subject to an automatic long-term removal
from school for certain offenses, therefore the school's interest
in and need for the juvenile delinquency proceeding's success in
the removal of the student is much less or virtually gone. 208
Additionally, some argue that an important factor when
determining the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule is
whether the rule is necessary to inform the officials of their

207. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 39. See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1111
("While having students stand trial may not be preeminent in the minds of school
officials, it is this author's view that school authorities will be deterred from engaging
in unconstitutional conduct by application of the exclusionary rule. With widespread
drug abuse and increased instances of violent crime currently plaguing American
schools, teachers and other school authorities have a keen interest in obtaining the just
punishment of those students who engage in such activities. Given this motivation, it
seems unlikely that a teacher would engage in an unlawful search knowing that such
conduct could jeopardize, if not preclude, the punishment of a wayward student."). But
see Rosenburg, supra note 202, at 40 ("since [school] officials could get student removed
from school in a disciplinary proceeding in which illegally seized evidence is used, then
presumably they would not be deterred by applying the exclusionary rule in juvenile
court unless they wanted the child removed from the community or at least from school
for a long time and a school disciplinary proceeding could not accomplish such a
result.").
208. See, e.g, Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless
School Violence, Due Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An
Examination of Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District,
2002 BYU Enuc. & L.J. 159, 162-63 (2002) ("When the Gun-Free Schools Act was
enacted, it required each state to enforce both a one-year expulsion for any student who
brings a firearm to school and a referral to the local criminal or juvenile justice system.
Shortly after the passage of the Act in 1991, local school boards and administrators
began to exercise wide discretion in the use of zero tolerance policies, and they applied
these zero tolerance laws not only to other weapons (i.e. knives), but also to the
possession or use of drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and a host of other student behaviors that
many would argue cause no serious threats or safety concerns to schools.").
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errors, "[t]herefore, without the exclusionary rule there may be
no effective means of informing school officials of their Fourth
Amendment mistakes and assuring that such errors are not
repeated." 209 But given the uncertainty of the true deterring
effect of the exclusionary rule on law enforcement in general,2 10
it seems to defy logic that such an uncertain effect on school
officials would be an adequate rationale for adoption of the rule
in the school context. 211 Furthermore, since the Supreme
Court's preeminent justification for invoking the exclusionary
rule has by far been the deterrence rationale, 212 application of
the rule when the deterring effect is so uncertain seems even
more unlikely and illogical.
Another rationale for the exclusionary rule is that the rule
is necessary to preserve judicial integrity. This rationale
"generally refers to the need for the judiciary to refrain from
associating itself with and thus apparently approving of the
government's use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal
prosecution." 213 Some argue that this concept presents a more
compelling reason for the exclusionary rule in the context of
schools, since students are taught by example and therefore
may lose respect for the judiciary and government when they
feel treated unfairly. 214
However, it seems more likely that young students with
less than adult understandings of government would take
notice of when a fellow student "gets off' on a technicality when
he or she really was guilty of the violation. This apparent
injustice teaches the wrong, but unintended, lesson to young
students. Therefore, appropriately, some argue that it is not
209. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 41-42.
210. Oaks, supra note 206, at 669-78.
211. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 42 (the fact that school officials are not
police officers creates the uncertainty of the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule
on school officials).
212. Stephen K. Sharpe & John E. Fennelly, Commentary, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard; When the Keeper Leads the Flock Astray-A Case of Good Faith or Harmless
Error?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 665, 671 (1984).
213. Mitchell, supra note 20:3, at 1228. See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1112
("This concept embodies the notion that it is wrong in itself for a court to sanction the
use of evidence that has been unlawfully seized, or to use Justice Stewart's words, the
'federal courts [should not] be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution
they are sworn to uphold.' If courts permit 'official lawlessness' by allowing the state's
used of tainted evidence, they risk the loss of support and invite disrespect and
anarchy.").
214. Hardin, supra note 201, at 1112; Mitchell, supra note 20il, at 1228-30; Vance,
supra note 201, at 278-79.
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right for a student to go free from punishment when they are
obviously guilty of possessing contraband. 215 In any event,
proponents using the judicial integrity rationale seem to ignore
the Supreme Court's treatment of it in Stone v. Powell: "While
courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the
integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force
as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence." 216
It is also argued that implementation of the exclusionary
rule compromises school safety. The notion is that because the
rule may prohibit the removal of a dangerous student, the rule
would allow students to go unpunished for breaking laws and
school rules, and it would produce a "chilling effect on effective
disciplinary enforcement" by causing school officials to refrain
from searching in some appropriate but possibly doubtful
circumstances for fear of having the evidence eventually
excluded. 217
As alluded to above, it is emphasized by some that the
exclusionary rule is the only realistic way to provide protection
for student's Fourth Amendment rights. 218 Conversely, some
say that extending the rule to the school context is not
necessary because there are already adequate alternatives for
enforcement, such as civil rights lawsuits against the school
and/or the school official(s). 219 It is argued:
Critics of the exclusionary rule who assert that the use of civil
suits . . . will adequately deter unreasonable searches of
students by public school officials overlook the difficulties in
pursuing these remedies and the historic failure of these
alternatives to protect students' rights. Among other
difficulties in bringing civil suits against public school officials
are the following: 1) fear of reprisals; 2) jury prejudice in favor

215. Walts, supra note 201, at 131 nA6 (New Jersey's Deputy Attorney General
Allan J. Nodes believes that "applying the rule is inappropriate even though a search is
based on less than reasonable suspicion if some type of illegal contraband is discovered
because the improper search and seizure does not negate the fact that the student is
guilty of having possessed the contraband. lf that evidence is suppressed in an effort to
make up for the improper seizure then the student will possibly avoid punishment or
prosecution .... '[Tjwo wrongs do not make a right,' and ... letting the guilty student
go free because he was illegally searched is improper.").
216. 428 U.S.165, 185 (1976).
217. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 122:1-21 (citations omitted). See also Vance, supra
note 201, at 275.
218. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1227-28; Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 41-42.
219. Vance, supra note 201, at 275-76.
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of government officials; 3) prohibitive litigation costs, and
because of the dim prospects for success, the likely
unavailability of securing legal representation on a
contingency fee basis; 4) ignorance that the official conduct
was illegal or actionable; and 5) the likelihood of low damage
awards absent physical harm to the claimant. Furthermore,
teachers and school administrators have a qualified immunity
from damages for claims of constitutional violations stemming
from their "good faith" actions. 220

Furthermore, one scholar, while noting the low likelihood
that a school official would ever be subjected to any substantial
civil liability, boldly stated, "[t]hey might as well decide that
students have no protection under the Fourth Amendment,
because the removal of the exclusionary rule could
unquestionably have that effect.'>22 1
While proponents make their arguments and hope that the
Supreme Court will apply the exclusionary rule in the school
search context, 222 some predict that such a prospect is grim. 223
One scholar posited that in light of Court precedent dealing
with the exclusionary rule, several factors, such as the fact that
school officials are not police officers, the uncertainness of the
deterring impact of the exclusionary rule, and the Court's
inclination to grant school officials broad latitude to maintain
school safety and appropriate student conduct, the Court is not
likely to see the exclusionary rule as appropriate in such a
setting. 224
In sum, scholars and others disagree about which way the
basic rationales underlying the exclusionary rule pull when
applied to juvenile delinquency and criminal proceedings
stemming from unconstitutional school searches. However, it is
apparent that most of the primary stated justifications for the
exclusionary rule could arguably be used by either side in
support for their respective positions. Overall, it seems that the
most reasonable and likely answer is that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied in a juvenile delinquency or criminal
proceeding when the search was conducted in a school and by a
school official acting on his or her own authority. This

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

!d. at 279-80.
Walts, supra note 201, at 1il:3.
Id.
Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 42-1:3.
Id.
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conclusion is most reasonable in light of the primacy of the
deterrence rationale in Supreme Court precedent and the
uncertainty of the deterring value that the exclusionary rule
would have on school officials since they are not law
enforcement officers engaged in the business of ferreting out
crime. 225 Additional support for this conclusion is found in the
Court's apparent disfavor of the "judicial integrity" rationale 226
and the fact that the Court acknowledges that the exclusionary
rule does not extend as far as does the Fourth Amendment. 227
The Court has referred to the rule as merely a "judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 228 Also,
there are other remedies that remain available as a deterrent
for serious violations. 229 There is also a high societal cost in
school safety and discipline from having the rule. 23 Finally,
the Court has consistently treated schools as "special" in the
context of the Fourth Amendment. 231 In light of these
considerations, it seems most reasonable that the exclusionary
rule should not and would not apply. In any event, the prospect
for the Supreme Court's decision on this issue is uncertain.

°

IV. CONCLUSION
In the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. majority opinion, the Supreme
Court purposefully left open certain questions and issues. One
of the most important questions is the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency and criminal
proceedings when the evidence has been seized in school, by a
school official, in violation of the Fourth Amendment standard
announced in the opinion itself. By leaving this question open,
courts across the country, both before and after T.L.O., have
reached varying conclusions on the issue. The various
rationales have also differed, and there are valid arguments for
both sides. Although it appears that the majority of scholarly

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
United States v. Calandra, 111 U.S. 338, 319 (1971).
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.
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publications and cases argue for the application of the rule in
the school search context, the same stated justifications and
rationales have also been used by others to argue against the
application of the rule. While not without valid arguments to
the contrary, it seems most reasonable that the exclusionary
should not apply in juvenile delinquency and criminal
proceedings when the evidence is based on a school search
conducted by a school official in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In any event, due to the Court's pattern of
treating the school environment in unique and sometimes
unpredictable ways as it pertains to constitutional rights, the
predictions about the Court's possible resolution of this
question are not without hesitance and qualification. The
future of the exclusionary rule in the school context is, at the
very least, unclear.
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